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Abstract. An autonomous system consists of physical or virtual
systems that can perform tasks without continuous human guidance.
Autonomous systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, rang-
ing from unmanned vehicles, to robotic surgery devices, to virtual
agents which collate and process information on the internet. Ex-
isting autonomous systems are opaque, limiting their usefulness in
many situations. In order to realise their promise, techniques for mak-
ing such autonomous systems scrutable are therefore required. We
believe that the creation of such scrutable autonomous systems rests
on four foundations, namely an appropriate planning representation;
the use of a human understandable reasoning mechanism, such as ar-
gumentation theory; appropriate natural language generation tools to
translate logical statements into natural ones; and information pre-
sentation techniques to enable the user to cope with the deluge of in-
formation that autonomous systems can provide. Each of these foun-
dations has its own unique challenges, as does the integration of all
of these into a single system.
1 Introduction
An autonomous system consists of physical or virtual systems that
can perform tasks without continuous human guidance. Autonomous
systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, ranging from un-
manned vehicles, to robotic surgery devices, to virtual agents which
collate and process information on the internet. Such systems can po-
tentially replace humans in a variety of tasks which can be dangerous
(such as refuelling a nuclear reactor), mundane (such as crop pick-
ing), or require superhuman precision (as in robotic surgery). Note
that some of these tasks could be safety critical, in the sense that hu-
man life can be at risk if the autonomous system does not behave
as intended. The reasoning processes driving an autonomous system
can range from reactive mechanisms (potentially interacting to cre-
ate complex behaviours c.f. [1]), to rule based systems such as [4, 12]
which are widely studied in the agents literature to very complex for-
malisms capable of dealing with uncertainty, online planning, and
the like (see [13] for an overview). While increasing reasoning com-
plexity can enable an autonomous system to handle a wider range
of situations, modelling and verifying the operation of such systems
becomes increasingly difficult.
A distributed autonomous system (DAS) consists of multiple au-
tonomous components (often referred to as agents), which can com-
municate with each other while cooperating or competing to achieve
some set of goals. The complexities of autonomous systems, particu-
larly when distributed, means that humans struggle to establish why
a system chose to behave as it did, to identify what alternative actions
the system considered, and to determine why these alternatives were
not selected for execution by the system. In other words, such sys-
tems are opaque. Such opacity is exacerbated by the formal models
typically used to drive the reasoning behaviour in such systems —
a human (and particularly a non-expert) often struggles to commu-
nicate with an autonomous system. This lack of understanding can
lead to unrealistic expectations of an autonomous system, or alterna-
tively to a lack of trust in it, causing inefficiencies at best, and leading
to dangerous outcomes in the worst cases. Such problems limit the
adoption of these types of systems.
The SAsSy project1 proposes to investigate computational mech-
anisms for providing transparency to humans regarding the internal
workings of a DAS. More specifically, we seek to utilise formal ar-
gumentation techniques to explain (to a human) why some plan was
chosen for execution by the system, and to allow the human to pro-
vide additional information which can be used to modify the plan.
We also aim to identify the best ways to present the explanations
(primarily as text, but also in diagrammatic form) to a human oper-
ator, based on extensive knowledge acquisition, user modelling and
user evaluation.
2 Example
Let us provide a simple example from the railway domain that il-
lustrates some of the issues. In this scenario multiple stakeholders
have to agree on a plan for maintaining railway lines. We assume
two actions are possible: Move(equipment, from, to) and
Repair(equipment, location). Repair is performed using
equipment, or more specifically a crane c1 or c2, and the crane has to
be moved to a location before repair of that location can take place.
Two locations, a and b need to be repaired. Location b has to be
repaired before location a (an example of a constraint; cannot be vi-
olated). Each of the stakeholders is represented by an agent and each
agent has different preferences and requirements. In our scenario,
agent α prefers not to use crane c2 (an example of preference; can be
violated). Now assume the following starting ‘state of the world’ S0:
Locations a and b need to be repaired, crane c1 is at location a and
crane c2 is at location b. SG is the goal state – the desired state of the
world where both locations a and b are fixed and all constraints are
fulfilled.
There are many plans that achieve the goal. Figure 1 shows the
two simplest plans. Suppose the system recommends plan A and a
human user has to decide whether to follow the plan.
The user may ask why the system chose plan A over plan B. Plan
A contains more steps (an extra Move action). We note that the ques-
tion can be asked and answered at different levels of granularity.
For example, a user may request an explanation for the transition
1 http://www.abdn.ac.uk/ncs/computing/research/ark/
projects/current/sassy/
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Figure 1. An example of two possible plans. A plan can be viewed as a sequence of transitions changing the state of the world. S0 is the initial state and SG
is the final (goal) state. The plan can be verbalised as, e.g.:“Move crane c1 to location b and fix it. Then move the crane to location a and fix location a. ”
s0 → s1 (“Why did you move c1 first?”) or for the plan itself (“Why
did you select a plan with more steps?”). It is also possible to argue
against competing plans, or for the winning plan.
A possible explanation for the transition may be: “So that c1 could
repair location b.” (why plan A) or “Using c2 at b goes against α’s
preference.” (why not plan B) . For the plan, the explanation may
be: “Because this means that we respect α’s preference not to use
crane c2 (why plan A), or “B involves the use of crane c2, which
goes against the preference of agent α.” (why not plan B).
We have presented a very simple example, that is limited to a sin-
gle decision or choice point. A more complex plan might involve a
large number of decisions (as well as a larger number of competing
plans). However we believe it to be sufficient to illustrate the major-
ity of challenges scrutability of plans and arguments bring forward.
In the next section we elaborate on these challenges.
3 Challenges
Agents execute actions in order to achieve goals. Within a distributed
system, the choice of actions to execute depends on both the envi-
ronment and the actions of other agents. Goals usually require more
than one action to be executed before they are achieved, and agents
therefore generate plans, either individually, or through interactions
with other agents. We therefore believe that in order to understand a
distributed autonomous system, a human must be able to understand
the plans within the system — including constraints, dependencies,
and why a given plan may have been chosen over other plans. Given
such an understanding, the human can critique the plans if necessary,
providing the agents with additional information which they can use
to modify their plans. The example in Section 2 described a scenario
where a person was supported in making a choice between two plans
where there is both a preference in terms of which resources to use
and a constraint in terms of the order in which certain things can
happen.
Recent research has investigated using formal argumentation to
perform distributed planning [16]. Much of the literature in argu-
mentation theory concerns itself with the status of an argument, that
is, whether the argument licenses certain conclusions. This work as-
sumes the existence of a static set of arguments, and computes an ar-
gument’s status based on this set. Intuitively, arguments can be seen
as a debate, or reasoning for and against a course of action. The psy-
chology of human reasoning as validation for argumentation seman-
tics is a largely unexplored area [11], but a recent strand of work
takes its inspiration from human dialogue to find intelligible expla-
nations of an argument’s status [2]. A popular approach to the use
of argumentation in planning requires the identification of appropri-
ate argumentation schemes — common templates for argument —
which are able to describe the planning process [6, 10].
Formal argument theory represents arguments using a logical
language. In order to make arguments accessible to non-technical
users, a system must be able to translate formulas of this formal log-
ical language into natural language. Natural Language Generation
(NLG) is the study of computer algorithms which produce under-
standable and appropriate texts in English or other human languages,
from some underlying non-linguistic representation of information.
Surprisingly little work in NLG has considered how such logical
statements can be expressed in a clear and understandable manner.
Substantial work on proof presentation exists, but this tends to focus
on the proof structure (e.g., by omitting easily inferable information
[5]) rather than the individual propositions. Despite useful early
work in the 1980’s [18], what is largely missing is an algorithm that
converts complicated input formulas into more accessible forms.
NLG researchers have typically simplified by departing from a fixed
logical form in which crucial presentation decisions have already
been made (e.g., [7, 15]). For example, suppose the system produces
the following argument in support of an action A:
(¬success→ ¬q) & (¬q → ¬p) & (¬p→ ¬A).
This formula is unnecessarily complex, and existing NLG systems
that express this “word-by-word” would tend to generate something
like: “If success is not achieved then q is false. If q is false then
p is false. If p is false then Action A is not performed”. A much
simpler presentation would be possible, however, e.g. “q guarantees
success; p implies q; Action A results in p”. To allow natural
language to do this, however, the formula above first needs to be
converted into the equivalent
(q → success) & (p→ q) & (A→ p).
There are two challenges here: Firstly, one needs to find out what is
an optimally understandable format for expressing a given proposi-
tion. This is an empirical question that can only be solved using ex-
tensive experimentation with human subjects. Secondly, one needs
to find algorithms for actually finding that optimal form. This can
be extremely challenging computationally, particularly if the logic is
very expressive.2 This is a famous open problem in NLG, known as
2 Logical formulas are typically equivalent to infinitely many other formu-
the Logical Form Equivalence problem ([14], [17]). We shall attack
the problem by relaxing the requirement that it is always necessary
to find the unique optimal form, settling for heuristics that give good
results in most situations. That is, find heuristics for expressions that
are “good enough” rather than necessarily the “best” form. A simple
example of a heuristic that might prove to go a long way is: shorter
formulas are easier to understand than longer ones. Finding the most
useful heuristics is an important challenge for the experimental work
in this area.
Making the language understandable is a crucial one for system
adoption. It could be possible to ask the system to reformulate a
statement, or to confirm a given interpretation, as one would a human
conversational partner. However, a system that requires too many ad-
ditional interactions is less likely to be adopted by users.
Other Information Presentation (IP) issues that our application
gives rise to include aggregation and summarisation of information.
For example, if a large number, say n, of locations need to be re-
paired, it would be cumbersome to spell this it in n separate steps
(“First move to location 1 and repair it; then move to location 2 and
repair it; ...; finally move to location n and repair it.”). It is much
better to combine these events in one phrase (saying “each location”)
and to leave out any obvious information. For instance, the system
might simply say “Repair each location, starting with the nearest
one and ending with the one furthest away”, which aggregates the
repairs actions and leaves out the ‘move’ actions because they are
inferable.
Beyond the elucidation of an individual plan, it is important to be
able to explain why one plan is superior to another, and this raises
Information Presentation (IP) challenges of its own. Consider Figure
1, for example. In an initial interaction it may be suitable to give a
high-level explanation of the choice between the plans A and B, as in
“A is proposed because we wish to respect α’s preference not to use
crane c2”. However, the user may also want to ask questions about
particular actions, such as why a certain crane was used or moved
first, and this may require more detailed explanations. Since differ-
ent users may have different information requirements, the system
should make use of adaptation and user modelling, to decide about
the level of abstraction, and the level of detail, that is required in
a given situation. Managers, for example, may only require a small
amount of high-level information, whereas others may need to scru-
tinise the plan in more detail, for example to make sure they agree
with the assumptions on which it is based. It also seems plausible
that there is a need to combine multiple levels of abstraction. For ex-
ample, a user may want to begin with a more high-level description
for which they then request a more detailed description, or scrutinise
aspects of.
Traditionally, diagrams have played an important role in argumen-
tation, with diagrams expressing networks of arguments supporting
and attacking each other [3]. These diagrams, however, become clut-
tered when networks are large and would benefit from aggregation
and summarisation as well. Given that each modality has its own ad-
vantages [8, 9], we shall explore how language can complement these
diagrams, for instance by placing text inside a diagram, or by using
one modality at a meta-level with respect to the other. For example, a
caption may be generated that highlights an important aspect of a di-
agram, for instance “Several arguments attacked this claim, but each
proved contentious”.
Given that the dialogue occurs as dynamic process involving
inter-dependent components, evaluation of these components is dif-
las, and finding out if two formulas are equivalent is undecidable in many
logics, or else computationally very expensive.
ficult, but critical. For example, it may be necessary to evaluate the
scrutability on multiple levels of abstraction such as an entire plan,
the argumentation in favour of a plan, and individual facts or argu-
ments. The evaluation therefore forms a final challenge in this pro-
gram of work.
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